Executive Overview
We chronicle how both Ukraine and Russia are rapidly adapting their arsenals and industrial-base during the war of attrition, fielding improvised strike weapons and guided munitions to break strategic stalemates. Our analysis covers key themes: conversion of legacy systems, home-grown missile development, doctrinal adaptation, battlefield employment and the implications of this innovation race.
Legacy Bombs to Rocket-Boosted Glide Munitions
Russia has undertaken a systematic conversion of Soviet-era unguided bombs into rocket-assisted glide or powered munitions to strike deeper into Ukrainian territory. One open-source report describes how Moscow has begun mass-testing long-range glide bombs with booster rockets capable of reaching up to 200 km.
► These designs show how industrialised retrofit programmes reduce cost of reach and enable saturation of rear areas.
► The upgrade uses commercially-available turbojet or solid rocket motors—giving new life to older bomb bodies
Strategic advantage
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Cost per unit is significantly lower than true cruise missiles.
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Existing production lines handle bomb manufacture; retrofit adds guidance.
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Enables Russia to deepen strike depth without fully new missile programmes.
Ukrainian Home-Built Cruise and Loiter Weapons
Ukraine likewise is innovating under pressure, developing new missiles and drones to impose cost on Russian operations and strike infrastructure far behind the front line. One notable system is the Trembita, a locally-produced cruise missile with a pulse-jet engine, reported range ~140 km, and cost around US$10,000.
► The Trembita exemplifies a low-cost, high-volume approach – aiming to saturate rather than individually dominate.
► Ukraine has also fielded new long-range guided systems aimed at Russian logistical lines. For example: development of the FP‑5 Flamingo, reportedly with very long range and heavy payload.
Key characteristics
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Low unit cost enables scaling despite constrained budgets.
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Ranges and payloads still below top-tier Western missiles, but sufficient to threaten logistics, rear areas and strategic infrastructure.
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Combined with decoys and drone swarms to overwhelm air-defences.
Doctrine & Tactics: Adaptation on the Fly
Saturation + Attrition Strategy
Russia’s approach increasingly emphasises quantity and reach: converting older bombs for longer strike, deploying swarms of drones and guided bombs to overwhelm Ukraine’s A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) layers.
Ukraine counters by exploiting asymmetric advantages: agility, innovation, and targeting of Russian rear supply lines and infrastructure, forcing Russia to extend its defensive zone.
Fragmentation of the Kill-Chain
Both sides are breaking the traditional sensor-shooter-target kill chain into modular components:
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reconnaissance drones feed target data
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improvised missiles or gliders are launched in mass
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decoys or drones trigger air-defence response first, clearing the way for heavier strike.
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digital/EO/IR upgrades help older weapons deliver precision effects.
Battlefield Employment and Operational Impacts
Russia’s Rear-Strike Capability
The retrofit bombs allow Russia to strike Ukrainian rear logistical hubs, command centres and supply routes from longer standoff ranges, forcing Ukraine to redeploy air-defence assets further back, stretching its limited inventory.
Ukraine’s Deep Strike Leap
With systems like Trembita and Flamingo, Ukraine is pushing into a realm of deep strike capability, targeting Russian logistics, energy infrastructure, and rear bases. Reports indicate these strikes are already contributing to disruptions in Russian fuel supply chains.
Air-Defence Stress & Redesign
Ukraine’s defensive networks are under increasing strain:
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Need to intercept more threats at longer ranges.
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Must redeploy limited assets for depth rather than front-line coverage.
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Russian saturation plus Ukrainian long-reach both force adaptation in deployment strategy.
Industrial Base and Innovation Dynamics
Russian Industrial Adaptation
Russia is leveraging its vast legacy arsenal and industrial capacity: bomb production lines, mobilisation of retrofit kits, and integration of commercial engine components to accelerate production. The reuse of existing structure gives a cost-time advantage.
Ukrainian Innovation Ecosystem
Ukraine’s war economy is spurring rapid innovation: start-ups, design bureaus, volunteer engineers, and small factories are enabling new weapon production under war conditions. This decentralised model allows quicker prototyping and deployment. The success of cheap but effective missiles underscores this shift.
Cost-Effectiveness Return
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Russia: Upgraded bombs cost far less than state-of-the-art cruise missiles, enabling mass.
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Ukraine: Home-built missiles cost orders of magnitude less than imported systems, enabling volume.
The net effect: both sides seek to transform quantity into strategic effect rather than rely solely on high-cost precision weapons.
Strategic Implications and Future Outlook
Prolongation of the Conflict
The emergence of cheaper, longer-reach weapons favours a war of attrition more than swift offensive operations. Frontlines may stabilise as both sides develop deeper strike and defence layers.
Escalation Risk
As reach expands, the geographic depth of conflict increases. Ukraine striking deep into Russian territory, Russia striking into Ukraine’s interior, each invites escalation risk—political, military, and industrial.
Air-Defence Arms Race
Air-defence systems must adapt: better sensors, multiple layers, rapid reload, active-passive decoy resilience. The cheaper the strike weapons become, the harder for defenders to field intercepts at scale.
Industrial Mobilisation as Battleground
The war is increasingly as much about industrial capacity—retrofit kits, drone factories, missile production—as it is about traditional frontline combat. Nations supplying Ukraine, and Russia’s domestic defence industry, become central actors.
Conclusion: The Improvisation Era
We are witnessing the emergence of an improvisation era in modern warfare—where legacy weapons are converted, non-state innovation enters the field, and cost-volume dynamics challenge the traditional precision-only paradigm. For Ukraine and Russia, the ability to rapidly prototype, mass-produce and field new strike systems is reshaping the battlefield.
As this cycle evolves, the frontline becomes not only geographic—but industrial, doctrinal and technological. Those who can integrate innovation, production and employment effectively will gain decisive advantage.
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